Sphinx

Is there a plausible outcome in the Melian Dialogue situation in which the Melians ‘win’ in any sense? I’m starting to think about developing the second half of my “choose your own adventure” version, and obviously this is a crucial issue; is the point of the exercise that players should try every possible approach and gradually recognise the bleak reality of their fate, or that there should be a way out, however obscure and improbable? This question was actually brought into focus this week by the spectacle of Yanis Varoufakis offering advice to Theresa May on negotiating with the EU: the man who knew he was in a Melian Dialogue situation, but still tried to force it to a different outcome. Yes, that went well…

One obvious point is that it all depends on how you define winning. If it’s getting everything you want (continuing independence) then you’re going to be disappointed; yes, in the game someone playing the Athenians could choose to agree to Melian neutrality, but the likely result is a furious reaction from the Athenian demos directed against their wimpy generals for ignoring orders – in reality, it seems unlikely to impossible that an Athenian commander would have made such a decision.

Would ‘survival, under Athenian hegemony’ count as winning, as that’s a much more plausible outcome? At this point it becomes clear that this also depends on how you define ‘the Melians’. The point is obscured by our (and to a lesser degree Thucydides’) tendency to talk about ‘the Melians’, but the Athenians’ interlocutors are the representatives of the Melian oligarchs, who have requested private discussions precisely – as the Athenians point out – because they’re afraid the people will much more readily agree to Athenian demands, even absolute surrender.

It’s not just the possibility that the people might prioritise their survival over abstract conceptions of sovereignty and resistance to foreign domination, whereas their leaders are more strongly committed to such ideals. It is also the case that the oligarchs would most likely lose out personally if Melos surrenders; the first step of the Athenians would be to install a more friendly regime, doubtless drawn from the democratic party in Melos, and that would entail exile at best, more likely execution for the oligarchs. “Better death than dishonour” becomes a different calculation when the ‘dishonour’ option involves death as well. The definition of ‘winning’ depends in part on whether the Melian oligarchs assume complete identity between their own preferences and those of their people, or recognise a possible divergence and accept the possibility of self-sacrifice for the greater good.

And obviously there’s then the possibility of extending this analysis to other, more recent Melian Dialogue situations – where it actually becomes rather trite. It is difficult to have confidence that the UK government is working wholeheartedly in the interests of the whole country as it approaches negotiations over Brexit; at best it’s working in the interests of the slim majority who voted to Leave, but more plausibly it’s working on the basis of self-interested electoral calculation, fulfilling the alleged desires of that slim majority regardless of the likely impact on their actual interests.

The Melian oligarchs were honest enough not to pretend that the masses were anything other than spear-fodder; May et al claim to be acting in their name, as mere instruments of the popular will, with this mandate to be renewed and expanded next month. The optimistic view is that an increased majority will make it easier for the strong, stable and sensible Tories to ignore the most deranged Brexiteers – but that assumes there is some recognition of the possibility of a national interest separate from the personal preferences of the oligarchs and their calculations of future electoral advantage.

Put another way: one key issue in any Melian Dialogue situation is how each side conceives of a successful outcome – how far it excludes from consideration, for its own selfish reasons, outcomes that others within that community might consider acceptable. Thucydides’ account, and subsequent analyses, show how unlikely a good compromise outcome is from the beginning. Artificial constraints – that the Melian oligarchs must come out on top, that any agreement with the EU must enhance the Tories’ electoral prospects – make it even less likely.