Sphinx

As I have noted before, the key to understanding the Brexit debate remains the paradoxes of the Greek philosopher Zeno of Elea (see previous discussions here and here), which were, it is implied in Plato’s Parmenides, originally composed to support his friend Parmenides’ contention that any perception of change or progress is an illusion designed to distract us from horror of a senseless universe. The relevant passage reads as follows:

When the recitation was completed, Socrates requested that the first thesis of the first argument might be read over again, and this having been done, he said: What is your meaning, Zeno? Do you maintain that if being is many, it must be both like and unlike, and that this is impossible, for neither can the like be unlike, nor the unlike like – is that your position?

Just so, said Zeno.

And if the unlike cannot be like, or the like unlike, then according to you, being could not be many; for this would involve an impossibility. And if we speak of a Brexit Debate, then this implies the existence of some shared conception of what is being debated, which is manifestly not the case. For men may have different ideas of the best way to achieve a particular goal, whether that is the health of the city or the establishment of justice, and they may therefore debate the best means of achieving this; and they may differ on the question of the definition of health or of justice, but if they agree that such a definition should be agreed among themselves then they may seek through the discussion of opinions to reach a shared understanding; but if each is concerned only with his own private conception of the good, and is unwilling to modify this conception even when he sees that others hold different views, then there is no Brexit Debate, for there is no Brexit, but only a multitude of personal delusions.

Yes, Socrates, said Zeno; and I think that the truth of this observation is evident.

And even if such a Debate were to exist, it can never reach any useful conclusion; for although a majority of men might be willing to accept solution A, some of them will not do this until solution B has been eliminated, but some of those who would join in voting to eliminate B would not do so until solution C has been ruled out, and some of those who would join in voting down C will not do so unless solution A has been ruled out. And so, while a majority might band together to defeat D, they are incapable of agreeing on an alternative; and while the partisans of D will divide between A, B and C, in no case are they numerous enough to swing the vote decisively.

Yes, Socrates, said Zeno. But although you are as keen as a Spartan hound in pursuing the track, you do not fully apprehend the true motive of the composition, which is not really such an artificial work as you imagine; for my purpose was to protect the arguments of Parmenides against those who make fun of him. I retort upon them that claim to believe in the existence of a Brexit Debate which will through reasoned deliberation reach a positive conclusion, that their hypothesis appears to be still more ridiculous than the hypothesis that there has never been any such thing…