‘Doom-scrolling’ is, I imagine, a familiar thing, that many of us have been doing far too much of lately. You may not, however, have come across ‘professional doom-scrolling’, which unfortunately does not mean you get paid for it, but rather involves justification of the activity through some sort of “but I have to do this for work”, addressed to frustrated loved ones and even to ourselves, to explain how this is not simply a deeply unhealthy bit of obsessive behaviour. It’s relevant to this piece I’m working on; I need to cover related issues in class next week; there’s a developing methodological debate that connects to my area. This practice is quite distinct from what we might call ‘catastrophe dissemination’, the uncontrollable urge to link current events to one’s own research in order to write topical social media posts and would-be popular comment pieces, although the professional doom-scroller may indeed end up writing such pieces as a doubling-down on their original justification for spending a deeply problematic amount of time on the Twitter.
In my defence – or as a further plank of laughable self-delusion – I started thinking about this post when struggling a few weeks ago to finish a piece on ‘Thucydides on Twitter’ which made engagement with the platform unavoidable, but also meant – for better or worse – that most of the doom was focused through references to Thucydides. This does, if nothing else, reduce it to a manageable quantity of information, albeit – as happens in the midst of any such crisis – a dramatic increase on the usual levels of background quotation and comment. On an average day, one would expect somewhere between 30 and 50 Thucydides-related tweets, excluding those that show up in search engines because it’s part of someone’s ID or user name; at the moment we’re getting about 50 to 70, which is down from the peak of 100+ in the last week of February – and I would also say, a bit more subjectively, that fewer of these than normal are contextless quotes advertising mindfulness classes and wellness, and there’s a noticeably higher level of comment and engagement – and debate, rather than so much of the single account laying down the law to (often rather limited) followers.
I briefly had the idea of including a section in the chapter I was writing specifically on the analysis of Thucydides-related responses to the Russian attacks on Ukraine, in 2014 and 2022, but there was not in the end any space within the word limit. It’s scarcely the most vital response to the war, but this does offer an interesting reflection of the place of Thucydides in wider culture across the globe, and ways in which his work and associates ideas can be deployed, so it seems worth summarising the results here instead – if only because I’ve managed so few posts this year…
In 2014, reading current events through the lens of Thucydides was a pretty minor preoccupation; the number of quotations of the Melian Dialogue – ‘The strong do what they can, the weak suffer what they must’ – doubled from February to March, but that’s a doubling from 20 to 45; plenty of these are the usual bots, churning out random quotations in the belief that this builds meaningful engagement, but 13 of the March quotes including a #Ukraine or #Crimea tag, or made some explicit comment. By April, the number had fallen back to the mid-twenties, mostly bots, and/ or tagged with things like #Leadership (and #NationalTaxDay, for some reason). Another thirty or so tweets refer to the Melian Dialogue without quoting it, or offer general comments relating Thucydides to the situation. This is too small a sample to establish clear patterns rather than just making subjective observations, beyond the fact that there is no single reading.
The Dialogue is clearly assumed to express a truth about war and/or foreign policy – “If you want to understand Crimea read T. not the armchair experts”; “T. described why wars 2500 years ago and human condition has not changed” – but the nature of that truth is uncertain: roughly a quarter of the tweets seem to take it to be a description of the way the world works (“If T. is correct then so long Crimea”; “anyone wanting to see the limits of diplomacy should read the Melian Dialogue”), roughly a quarter see it as a key to Putin’s mentality or Russian strategy (“As Putin’s patron saint, T., said…”; “It is a general law of nature to rule wherever one can #Russia”), and roughly half adopt no position that I can discern, but either assume the interpretation must be obvious or put forward Thucydides to open up discussion (and/or establish their social media persona as the sort of person who knows and quotes T.) rather than to make a specific point. All these tweets are in English (I haven’t searched for other languages), although one did link to a fascinating online post in Russian that quoted the Melian Dialogue and concluded “so it is clear from which eggs those nameless and polite little green men hatched on the northern coast of the Black Sea”. Where geographical information about the account is provided, which is rare, the majority are associated with the USA. Overall there is no clear tendency to support or condemn Russia or identify with any particular side, only an established belief that Thucydides offers some sort of illumination or relevant knowledge.
In a lot of ways, comparison with the last couple of months reveals significant continuity. The number of registered Twitter users has more than doubled between 2014 and 2021, so it’s not too surprising that the number of references to Thucydides in the context of Ukraine and the Russian invasion in January and February this year is a bit more than double the 2014 numbers – c.160 evocations or quotations of the Melian Dialogue. Some of these are directly linked to pieces published in the mainstream media, in particular a commentary on Russian foreign policy by Sergey Radchenko (“Putin… has a worldview closer to that of the Greek historian Thucydides”); in March, which I haven’t yet analysed in detail, discussions of the Realist IR theorist John Mearsheimer, his argument that NATO expansion effectively provoked Russia, and the question of whether or not his ideas are actually drawn from those of Thucydides (a profile by Adam Tooze argued not, citing a book on The Atlantic Realists by Matthew Specter that I haven’t read yet to see how much it draws on the work of people associated with my past research project, or if this is a matter of parallel arguments), meant that references to Thucydides in published articles went further through the roof.
One significant change has been the establishment of the ‘Thucydides Trap’ as a trope, if not cliché, of global politics discussion – in 2014, this was only just starting to be mentioned (20 or so tweets all told in March, nothing in February) and almost always just in the form of retweets of articles. In January and February this year, besides 70-odd TT tweets limited to US-China relations and 85 either focused on other conflicts (India-Pakistan, sports teams, bitcoin versus old-fashioned money) or just offering a quote or reference without any specific theme indicated, there were 60+ tweets that linked the idea directly to the invasion of Ukraine. 90% of these asserted or clearly assumed the truth of the Trap, with most presenting it as inevitable – it is clearly seen by most as an objective attribute of the world, rather than a theory (whether attributed to Thucydides or Graham Allison); the remainder of these tweets, with just one exception, were agnostic about the idea rather than rejecting it (whereas discussions of the Trap in relation to China do regularly reject its premises).
“The primary cause of the Ukraine War was the growth in power of NATO and the alarm this inspired in Russia.” What is striking about these Trap tweets is that, where the author’s evaluation of blame or responsibility can be clearly identified, it is in almost all cases directed against the United States (and to a much lesser degree NATO, which in this context is generally presented as simply the puppet or agent of the US; still more so Ukraine, which is deprived of all agency). “Russia=Sparta. USA/Ukraine=Athens. I am Thucydides and this is my story.” “I think TT would better refer to Sparta (Russia) v Athens and its minions from the league of Delos (NATO).” “US is in the TT and this is their solution; Europe, Russia and Ukraine are just being sacrificed.” Perhaps most strikingly, a journalist from Chinese state-affiliated media simply quoted “It was the rise of Athens and the fear this aroused in Sparta…” with a map of NATO expansion. Indeed, far from being an objective situation, the Trap is sometimes presented rather as a strategy: “Ukraine was a huge T Trap set by NATO for Russia and Putin didn’t fall into it yet.”
This holds true, remarkably, whether the US is presented as the established (or, increasingly often, ‘declining’ or ‘waning’) power lashing out against a rising Russia to try to shore up its position, or as the aggressive ‘rising’ power seeking to extend its hegemony. At least in English-language tweets, the apparently more plausible (or at least no less vague or tendentious) interpretation of events in terms of an established/declining Russia acting out of fear at a rising, independent-minded Ukraine is conspicuously absent. Even when the idea of the TT is explicitly questioned, this serves as the basis for critique of the USA; “TT is glamour trash from the American Think Tank Myth Factory; if Russians wanted to fight, NATO would have been smashed to bits a long time ago” (n.b. this one comes from January, attacking US claims that invasion was a serious possibility).
This pattern is so consistent that one suspects either that the popular reception of Allison’s T-Trap has now become established as a drama about potential US aggression in all circumstances, rather than being about the structural dynamics of a specific situation, or that – rather like the Mearsheimer version of Realism that sees NATO activity in Eastern Europe as the problem – the idea comes readily to hand as a means for pro-Russian actors to recruit NATO sceptics to the cause of delegitimising opposition to the invasion. There are perhaps echoes of the ‘decadence of the West’ rhetoric offered by Putin and sympathetic European politicians and commentators; again, Biden’s USA is simultaneously seen as lashing out to protect its position against new, popular movements and leaders and as aggressively forcing its woke agenda on innocent traditionalists. Certainly the dominant demand is for any further US involvement to be resisted, and Putin’s actions to be accepted, whatever the result. As one Austrian poster claimed, “We are in T Trap; surrender and keep peace, no other option.” Perhaps this is a genuine conclusion from reflection on international affairs; perhaps the message came first, and the Thucydides Trap is one means for promoting it.
As in 2014, references to other passages in Thucydides, especially the Melian Dialogue, are more varied in their claims and conclusions, more often presented as a matter of debate, and much more frequently ascribed to Thucydides as a thinker worth taking seriously rather than just a taken-for-granted condition of the world. The three principles of state motivation are cited multiple times, but more as an explanation of Russian thinking than a justification of it. “T. was right: strongest motives are fear, honor and interests, Putin is captive to all three.” “What if the last of T’s fear, interest and honour means more to Putin than to us?” “Wars rarely come from mistakes; if Russia decides to invade it’s for T.’s fear, of NATO expansion, or UKR falling into W orbit (not in their interest).”
In February, no one at all that I could see turned to the Sicilian Expedition as a lens through which to view the Russian invasion; this may have changed over the course of recent weeks, as its failures have become more apparent, or – and I don’t actually recall seeing any such comment – this may be further evidence for the dominance in Thucydides reception of a very small number of passages, even if others might be equally relevant. That limited list certainly includes the funeral oration, with a few people quoting variants of “the secret of happiness is freedom” in relation to the Ukrainian war effort, but above all it means the Melian Dialogue.
“Ukraine brings to mind the words of the Athenians: hard power counts.” “The Melian Dialogue is about the evil done by a great power to a small country who wants to choose its own alliance partner.” As in 2014, two different lines of interpretation are clearly visible. On the one hand, its statements are, as in the standard Realist interpretation, presented as a description of the world and the only reasonable form of behaviour in such circumstances. “Putin just did what he was supposed to do; Realism is vindicated; the strong do what they can.” History shows us the only real principle is might makes right.” “The strong do what they can: if Ukraine is divided it is weak; if Putin can divide he rules; the EU is united in running away.” On the other hand, the words of the Athenians are seen as epitomising the mentality of “Great Power cynicism”, that should be resisted and/or will not prevail. Russia “decided to read the Ukrainians the Melian Dialogue.” “Putin’s speech [on recognition of breakaway republics] is remarkably compelling; that it sounds like half the Melian Dialogue is not a great indication of where the world is headed.” “Remember what happened to Athenians a few years later.”
One significant development since 2014 is the extent to which these references sometimes include an explicit call to action, or at least a call to learn from events via Thucydides. “Take note from T; this is a natural law that transcends Putin, the only thing that allows liberalism/peace to work is strength.” “Lesson from history: get strong and stay strong.” “Be strong and help those that are weak.”(!) Another is the level of explicit debate, rather than just the presence of different perspectives in parallel, and an awareness of how citations might be deployed for a purpose. “The MD is not a side, it’s an expression of current state of affairs”; in response, “people who cite it are usually just telling us to give up and accept things.” “Seems like those who explained/justified Russian action through Melian Dialogue forgot T-Daddy meant it as a cautionary tale about arrogance and hubris.”
Given this range of perspectives, it’s surprising how often people still simply cite lines from the Melian Dialogue, in response to tweets or news stories about Ukraine or tagged appropriately, without any further explanation. Okay, yes, it’s clearly relevant, one might say to them – but are you offering this as a Mearsheimeresque defence of Russian actions and an argument for staying out of things, or a moral condemnation of imperialist aggression and call to support the Ukrainian government? Or neither, but just an evocation of Thucydides as the Man Who Knows, reflecting on the timelessness of war and brutality? (There have been a fair few quotes of the Auden poem as well, in the spirit of “and we thought we had seen the last of war, well, Thucydides knew this was a naive optimism…”).
I’ll be quite honest, I’ve done this myself, without thinking – on the assumption that anyone who follows my feed will know perfectly well what I mean. Maybe everyone is making the same assumption, without thinking that a tweet may well be read in isolation, out of any such context – or even hoovered up, analysed and categrised by an academic who is simply trying to rationalise continued anxious perusal of social media for some sign of hope that isn’t just a fine comfort in danger…
The problem with the Melian Dialog analogy to the proxy war between Russia and Ukraine as engineered by the US, is that Russia, as the Athenian side, was fine with Ukraine remaining neutral. Only when Ukraine chose to ally itself with NATO did Russia take action. This would have been the equivalent of Melos deciding to ally itself with Sparta. The problem with people quoting what Thucydides quotes the Athenian delegation as saying, “The strong do what they can, the weak suffer what they must”, is that they assume that Thucydides agrees with this sentiment. Clearly he did not as shortly after the Melian affair, an entire generation of Athenian men were mercilessly decimated by the coalition of Sparta and Syracuse. The Thucydides Trap that the US has fallen into is not between the US and Russia, but between the US and China. China is the rising power and the US is in decline. The US withdrew from Afghanistan in anticipation of a proxy war with Russia. The intelligence community got it completely wrong – Russia was/is no pushover. So the US idea to weaken Russia before taking on China was predictably misguided. If anything, it pushed Russia and China closer. Seeing Ukraine’s fate, Taiwan elect in a landslide the Kuomintang party in 2022, the party favoring closer ties to China. Taiwan has no desire to be the battleground of a US initiated proxy war with China. As an unanticipated side effect, inflation soared in the US and around the world. When does the national security apparatus take into account economics? It also created record profits for US DoD and fossil fuel corporations. And set back shifts to green energy as coal field set to close down had to be re-opened. As the war drags into its second year, it has become a war of attrition which Russia inevitably will win unless the US decides to escalate things to a nuclear MAD level.
I’m approving this comment with some misgivings; it’s great to have people engaging with the blog, but ideally that involves actual engagement and opening up a conversation, whereas this offers a series of assertions as if matters of fact whereas many of them are at best highly debateable.